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Abstract
Performance overhead introduced by security properties of e-voting
schemes needs to be investigated to have an insight on the average re-
sponse times that voters will observe when they cast their votes using
remote electronic voting systems. Timely responses of remote electronic
voting protocols are important to increase voters’ confidence in e-voting
systems. In this paper we will study the individual verifiability impact of
e-voting schemes on average response times of large scale e-voting scheme
known as DRE-i by using the well-known formal stochastic performance
evaluation process algebra language, PEPA. We will present a PEPA
model of the e-voting scheme and show the response time analysis when
voters verify the integrity of their votes.
Keywords: Performance modelling, PEPA, remote electronic voting.
1 Introduction
Today, we live in an unprecedented widespread usage of internet-connected dig-
ital devices that help services’ consumers to access and consume internet-based
electronic services in a relatively secure and reliable way. One influential and
emerging service is the electronic voting where many countries have used this ser-
vice electronically to increase the participation and turnout of voters in political
elections [16]. Scalability and timely responses are two crucial implementation
requirements for large scale e-voting systems and investigating the impact of
security complexity in e-voting schemes on scalability and timely responses will
help in designing more scalable and efficient e-voting systems. Recently, the
lack of proper performance evaluation for the scalability and timely responses
of the vote registration site of the UK government led to the crash of the site
hours before the registration deadline due to a burst in traffic [22].
Most of the research done on the evaluation of e-voting schemes was related
mainly to the evaluation of security properties of the e-voting systems such as
proving security requirement correctness in [21], [14] and [1], and little research
was done to investigate the performance aspects of e-voting schemes. In this
paper, we are concerned with the formal evaluation of the response time of large
scale DRE-i e-voting scheme [10]. Quantifying the response time of e-voting
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systems will help e-voting systems’ designers and security managers to build and
maintain secure, dependable and cost-effective electronic voting environments.
In particular, we are interested in the effect of individual verification actions
carried out by voters on the average response time that voters expect when
they cast their votes. The next section will provide the reader with a brief
background about the basic concepts of e-voting schemes and the performance
evaluation formalism using performance evaluation process algebra. In section
three, we will describe the behaviour of the DRE-i e-voting scheme and construct
and analyse the average time response of cast votes using PEPA. At the end, in
section four, we will present our conclusions.
2 Background
In this section we will provide a concise background which is closely related
to the formal performance analysis of secure electronic voting systems using
stochastic performance evaluation process algebra. The first subsection will
cover in brief the fundamental concepts of electronic voting schemes and the
second subsection will cover the main concepts of stochastic performance eval-
uation process algebra.
2.1 Electronic voting
In general cryptographic voting schemes consist of the following entities: vot-
ers, election authorities, candidates and adversaries. On election day, eligible
voters prove their identities to the election authorities to proceed and choose
their preferred candidates on ballots and cast their ballots in ballot-boxes. Be-
cause voting process requires high level of privacy to protect the secrecy of the
voters’ choices and identities, the e-voting schemes have to satisfy some security
requirements that can be delivered through well-known cryptographic building
blocks.
2.1.1 E-voting security requirements
Electronic voting security literature identified many security requirements for
e-voting protocols such as: completeness, privacy, soundness and robustness,
receipt-freeness, verifiability, fairness, eligibility, and unreusability. The follow-
ing is a brief description for the main e-voting security requirements and readers
can refer to [9] for more details.
Completeness(correctness). The secret ballot protocol is considered complete
(correct) if valid votes are counted correctly [7].
Privacy. The secret ballot protocol is considered privacy preserving if neither
the voter nor any other participant can link the voter with the ballot that he
cast. This property will prevent coercing and intimidating voters.
Soundness (robustness). In [7], the secret ballot protocol is considered sound
if the invalid votes are not counted in the final vote tally. Another related
requirement is the robustness of the secret ballot protocol which ensures that
the voting protocol can deliver the required results if faulty operations do not
exceed a defined threshold.
Receipt-freeness. A secret ballot protocol is considered receipt-free if no voter
can obtain or construct a proof that discloses how the voter voted. This prop-
erty will prevent vote selling and coercion.
Verifiability. A secret ballot protocol is called verifiable if anyone of protocol
participants can construct a proof that shows the protocol behaved correctly.
Fairness. A secret ballot protocol is called fair when no one can perform partial
tally before publishing tally result except the voter who already knows his cast
vote.
Eligibility. A secret ballot protocol has the eligibility property if only autho-
rised voters are allowed to express their choices by casting their ballots. Election
authorities identify and register voters who are eligible to vote and during the
vote-casting day, the authorities perform identification and authentication ser-
vices to prove the eligibility of each voter to vote. This property will prevent
fraudulent votes.
Unresuability. A secret ballot protocol is called un-reusable if the voter is
restricted to one valid vote. The last valid ballot cast by the voter will be
considered his vote and will be used in vote tallying process.
2.1.2 E-voting Cryptographic Building Blocks
To achieve these security features, the electronic voting schemes use different
cryptographic building blocks, which include blind signatures, mix-nets, encryp-
tion algorithms, and interactive and non-interactive proofs.
Encryption and signature primitives. Secret ballot protocols use encryp-
tion schemes to provide privacy for voters and use digital signature schemes to
bind votes to voters in a non-deniable way.
Blind signature. It was proposed by Chaum [3] to hide the message’s con-
tent to be signed from the signer and to certify the validity of the message by
a trusted third party (the signer). Blind signature can be used in electronic
voting to enable voters to get their votes certified by an election-trusted party
as eligible to be counted.
Mix-nets. Mix-nets were proposed by Chaum [4] for anonymous communica-
tion which is based on cryptography and random permutations and they are used
in e-voting to break the link between the voter and the vote’s receiver. There
are two types of Mix-nets protocols: decryption mix-nets [4] and re-encryption
mix-nets. In the decryption mix-nets the protocol starts with the encryption
phase where the voter’s encrypted vote is encrypted sequentially with the public
keys of the mix-servers and the encrypted vote will be passed to the first mix
server. Then each mix-server will partially decrypt the encrypted vote received
from the previous mix-server, shuffle the order of the decrypted votes, and pass
them to the next mix-server. The last mix-server will publish the result on a
bulletin board. In the re-encrypt mix-net, each mix server will re-encrypt the
received encrypted vote, shuffle the votes, and pass votes to next mix servers.
The last mix server will decrypt the encryption of the previous mix servers and
post the result on a bulletin board.
Homomorphic encryption. To satisfy the privacy requirement of secret bal-
lot protocol , the cryptographic based voting protocol may use some homo-
morphic encryption algorithms such as RSA [20], ElGamal [6], and Pailler [18].
It allows applying certain operations on sets of encrypted values (votes) with-
out decrypting them. By using suitable homomorphic encryption primitives in
electronic voting , tallies can be calculated from the encrypted ballots without
revealing the choice of the voter.
Interactive and non-interactive proofs. Some electronic voting schemes
provide the voting scheme participants with the capability of verifying the va-
lidity of some voting activities through the interactive or non-interactive proofs.
Interactive proof is a cryptographic protocol with two participants, the prover P
and verifier V. Through the protocol interactions, the prover tries to prove the
knowledge of a secret to the verifier and at the end of the protocol the verifier
either accepts or rejects the proof constructed by the prover.
Based on the building blocks used to preserve vote privacy, we can identify
three main cryptographic voting approaches: blind signature, homomorphic
and mix-nets. In blind signature approach, one election authority gives the
voter a token to confirm the eligibility of voter to vote. The token is a secret
message known to the voter and signed by the election authority and will be
submitted with the vote through anonymous channel to the tallying author-
ity. In homomorphic-encryption approach, the voter’s encrypted vote will stay
encrypted during tallying process and encrypted votes will be counted using
a property of homomorphic encryption. Finally in mix-net e-voting approach,
the link between the vote and voter is hidden by using layers of encryption and
random shuffles of batches of votes.
2.2 Performance Evaluation Process Algebra (PEPA)
Process algebra is an abstract language used for formal specification and design
of concurrent systems. Process algebra languages are used to model collections
of entities and their behaviour and the performance evaluation process algebra
(PEPA) is a well-known process algebra language with stochastic extension [12].
Because PEPA models underlie Continuous Time Markovian Chain, some
performance metrics can be derived from the steady state probability distri-
bution of PEPA models, such as throughput, utilisation and population levels.
However, due to state space explosion problem associated with large PEPA
models when deriving their state space, Jane Holliston in [13] presents a new
approximation approach using fluid analysis for performance analysis in PEPA
models. Her approach is very useful when modelling systems with very large
number of components because the fluid analysis approach does not depend on
the derived state space of the PEPA model. The new approximation approach
constructs a matrix called the activity matrix from the components and activi-
ties of the PEPA model, and by using the activity matrix the new approach can
generate a set of ordinary differential equations that approximately represent
the behaviour of the PEPA model. The system of ODEs can be solved and thus
the performance metrics of the PEPA model can be calculated.
PEPA Syntax. PEPA is a markovian process algebra that models systems
behaviour in terms of components and activities to evaluate their performance.
Activities have actions that happen during exponentially distrusted intervals,
and these activities when occur will change the components internal states.
Therefore, the underlying state space of PEPA model can be used to construct
Continuous Time Markov Chain (CTMC) and then the CTMC can be used to
derive the steady state probability distribution of the model. PEPA uses a few
combinators to construct formal stochastic process algebra models in a compo-
sitional way. The following represents a brief description for PEPA operators
and readers can investigate [12] for more formal description of PEPA operators.
Prefix (.) : ( α, r ).P . The component can undertake an activity of type α
at rate r and evolves into component P. The rate r is fixed during the lifecycle
of the model and the passive (unknown) rate of an action is denoted by the top
symbol T . The prefix operator can be used to model the behaviour of sequential
activities.
Choice (+) : P+Q . The composed components represent a system that
behaves as either P or Q . The first component to complete will change the
internal state of the system and the other component will be discarded.
Cooperation (./) : (P ./L Q) . The cooperation operator is used to model
the synchronisation behaviour of the system’s components. The operator uses
a cooperation set L to define the shared actions between the cooperating com-
ponents P and Q . When the cooperation set is empty the activities of the two
components will run in parallel P || Q .
Hiding: P/L . The operator / is used to hide a set of local actions denoted by
L and make them private to their component P . In PEPA language, the hidden
(local) actions are denoted by the tau symbol τ.
Constant: Adef=P . Constant is used to associate a name like A with a com-
ponent’s behaviour like P.
PEPA eclipse plugin. PEPA plugin is a tool for editing, compiling, and
deriving the state space of PEPA models. PEPA plugin can do static check-
ing to detect errors and warnings in PEPA code and detect the deadlocks in
PEPA models. Some of the warnings could be a result of unused processes and
rates, and unused activities in cooperation sets. Moreover, PEPA plugin uses
two well-known algorithms for performing stochastic simulation [8]: Gillespie’s
Stochastic Simulation Algorithm (SSA) and the Gibson- Bruck algorithm. More
details about PEPA and PEPA eclipse plugin can be found in [12] and [26]
respectively.
2.3 Related Research
Lamprecht et al. in [15] presented direct performance measurements of different
implementations of different cryptographic protocols, which showed that mea-
suring the performance of security protocols could be influenced by how the
protocol was implemented. Thus, during the performance evaluation process,
abstracting how the security protocol is implemented and the software/hardware
configurations used to run the protocol will lead to a more generalised and for-
mal performance evaluation of the security protocols .
In the past, there were some attempts to construct formal specifications ei-
ther to verify the correctness of security protocols using formal specification
languages such as communicating sequential processes (CSP), Event-B, and ap-
plied pi calculus, or to quantify and analyse the performance characteristics of
security protocols using formal performance modelling paradigms such as queu-
ing networks, petri-nets [28,29] and stochastic process algebra.
In proving security requirement correctness, Stathakidis, Schneider, and
Heather, [21] modelled the four stages of Ximix Mix net protocol and also mod-
elled an intruder using the CSP process algebra and FDR to verify the protocol’s
correctness. First, Stathakidis et al. modelled the mix net components with ab-
sence of dishonest participants and secondly modelled the Mix net protocol in
the presence of an adversary. Moreover, Culnane and Schneider in [5] modelled
and analysed the behaviour of the bulletin board using Event-B formal specifi-
cation language to verify the correctness of an ideal implementation of bulletin
board and the correctness of the behaviour of the bulletin board in the presence
of malicious participant. Furthermore, Kremer and Ryan [14] formalised three
security properties of Fujioka, Okamoto and Ohta scheme [7] using the applied
pi calculus language and they could prove that two of them were satisfied using
ProVerif tool.
In formal evaluation of the performance of security protocols, Zhao and
Thomas in [29] constructed a PEPA model for the exchange of secrete keys
for n pairs of participants using a trusted third party. They used the protocol
description of Stallings [27] to demonstrate how the KDC protocol behaves and
used PEPA to study the scalability of the model. The authors in [29] derived
the average utilisation of the KDC, and the average number of waiting requests
in the key distribution centre. In [24] , Thomas and Zhao used the fluid flow
analysis suggested by Hillston [13] to derive certain performance averages from
the PEPA model of KDC that they modelled in [29]. They used the ordinary
differential equations, ODEs, that represent the PEPA model of KDC to derive
the number of waiting clients in the KDC system, and to derive the response
time of the KDC.
Moreover, Zhao and Thomas in [28] modelled Zhou and Gollman non-
repudiation protocol using PEPA formalism and applied two performance anal-
ysis techniques for deriving performance metrics for the modelled protocol. The
two analysis approaches were the mean value analysis and the ordinary dif-
ferential equations. The authors used mean value analysis MVA to calculate
average response time and average number of derivatives, and used the fluid
flow approximation based ODEs of the underlying PEPA models to drive more
performance metrics such as average response time and queue length of waiting
customers. Without generating the state space for the PEPA models of Zhou
and Gollman non-repudiation protocol and with less computational complexity,
the authors, in [25], calculated certain average metrics using MVA.
For electronic voting performance evaluation using PEPA, Thomas in [23]
used PEAP to construct an electronic voting models for n voters with fault
recovery for faulty voters. The performance models in [23] captured the voting
scheme of Fujioka, Okamoto and Ohta [7] and two models constructed , one
was to represent the basic behaviour of the protocol and the other to represent
a simplified behaviour, and both models suffered from state-space explosion
problem when modelling large number of voters. To model large number of
voters , Thomas modified the basic model to make it represent a closed queuing
network and called the last model queue-based model. The numerical results
for analysing the three models showed that the number of voters in queue-based
model scale up better that the other models in terms of number of transitions
or states.
In [2] , Bradley and Gilmore used a stochastic simulation technique to con-
vert a PEPA model of an e-voting scheme to a set of rate equations. Each
rate equation represented an individual action of a component inside the PEPA
model and by using these rate equations they could build a simulation descrip-
tion file that fitted the Dizzy simulation tool. Therefore, they could simulate
and analyse the PEPA model for large number of voters. Manolopoulos et al.
in [17] modelled the architecture’s behaviour of the e-voting systems as open
Jackson networks of queues to evaluate the performance of the architecture.
They also presented a simulation software that they used to simulate their the-
oretical model and derived performance metrics such e-voting server utilisation
and average response time of the server. Finally, Ribarski and Antovski in [19]
implemented the decrypt and re-encrypt mix-nets protocols in Java and eval-
uated the time it takes to pass private messages between sender and receiver
through mix-nets using different key lengths of public key crypto-systems.
3 DRE-i PEPA Model and Analysis
Hao, Randell, and Clarke in [10] and Hao et al. in [11] presented DRE-i (Direct
Recording electronic with integrity) e-voting scheme. The scheme is an end-
to-end verifiable and self-enforcing cryptographic voting scheme based on the
Direct Recording Electronic voting systems which replaces the tallying authority
with a cryptographic homomorphic tallying algorithm. This scheme can be
used in controlled or uncontrolled internet voting environment for large scale
country-wide political elections or small-size elections like university students’
unions elections.
3.1 DRE-i Electronic Voting Scheme
In this scheme, for each eligible voter n ballots will be generated inside a temper-
prove security module of the e-voting server and each ballot will have two en-
crypted candidates known as cryptograms. The voter using the voting client
will prove his eligibility for voting to the voting server and will request a ballot.
Upon receiving the ballot, the voter will choose one of the two cryptograms and
send his selection to the server. The server will sign the received ballot and
send the signed ballot to the voter to either accept it and cast it as his vote or
reveal the signed ballot to verify that his selection reflects his intention. This
cast-or-verify game that the voter plays with the e-voting server represents one
part of individual verifiability that enables the voter to verify that his vote has
been recorded as intended. When the voter chooses to cast, the voting client
will send the voter’s ballot to the voting server and in turn the voting server
when it receives that ballot will send an acknowledgment of receiving the ballot
to the voting client. The voting client at this stage will print a transcript for
the voter that represents the signed encrypted ballot and this ends the vote
casting process from the voter side. On the other hand, when the voter chooses
to verify the integrity of the ballot that he is about to cast, the voting client
will send a request to the e-voting server to decrypt the cryptogram that hides
the chosen candidate and the server will reply with the decrypted cryptogram.
The voting client will print the revealed cryptogram and will asks the e-voting
server for another ballot so the voter can restart candidate selection process
again. Figure.1 demonstrates the interactions between the voter, voting client
and voting server to play the cast-verify game.
Figure 1: Cast-verify game of DRE-i e-voting scheme
The scheme utilises a public bulletin board to be used for publishing casted
ballots and auditing information about the election process. This information
will be used for tallying encrypted votes and for more verifiability actions.
3.2 PEPA Model
For the purpose of our research, we will be concerned about the behaviour of
voter, voting client, and e-voting server that is associated with cast-verify game.
Voter:
Voter0 = (selectVoteReq,T).Voter1
Voter1 = (selectVoteReply,rselectVoteReply ).Voter2
Voter2 = (castOrVerifyReq,T).Voter3




Voter7 = (reselect,rreselect).Voter8 +( endVoting ,rendVoting).Voter0
Voter8 = (reselectVoteReq,T).Voter1
Voting client:
DRE_Client0 = (voteCryptogramsReq,rvoteCryptogramsReq ).DRE_Client1
DRE_Client1 = (voteCryptogramsReply,T).DRE_Client2
DRE_Client2 = (selectVoteReq,rselectVoteReq ).DRE_Client3
DRE_Client3 = (selectVoteReply,T).DRE_Client4
DRE_Client4 = (signTranscriptReq,rsignTranscriptReq ).DRE_Client5
DRE_Client5 = (signTranscriptReply,T).DRE_Client6
DRE_Client6 = (castOrVerifyReq,rcastOrVerifyReq ).DRE_Client7
DRE_Client7 = (castReply,T).DRE_Client8 + (verifyReply,T ).DRE_Client9
DRE_Client8 = (castedVoteMSG,rcastedVoteMSG ).DRE_Client10
DRE_Client10 = (castedVoteAck,rcastedVoteAck ).DRE_Client0
DRE_Client9 = (verifiedVoteMSG,rverifiedVoteMSG ).DRE_Client11
DRE_Client11 = (verifiedVoteAck,T).DRE_Client12
DRE_Client12 = (reselectOrEndVoting,rreselectOrEndVoting ).DRE_Client13
DRE_Client13 = (reselect,T).DRE_Client14 + (endVoting,T ).DRE_Client0
DRE_Client14 = (reselectVoteReq,rreselectVoteReq ).DRE_Client3
Voting server:
DRE_SRV0 = (voteCryptogramsReq,T).DRE_SRV1
DRE_SRV1 = (voteCryptogramsReply,rvoteCryptogramsReply ).DRE_SRV2
DRE_SRV2 = (signTranscriptReq,T).DRE_SRV3
DRE_SRV3 = (signTranscriptReply,rsignTranscriptReply ).DRE_SRV4
DRE_SRV4 = (castedVoteMSG,T).DRE_SRV5 + (verifiedVoteMSG,T ).DRE_SRV6
DRE_SRV5 = (castedVoteAck,rcastedVoteAck).DRE_SRV0
DRE_SRV6 = (verifiedVoteAck,rverifiedVoteAck).DRE_SRV7
DRE_SRV7 = (reselect,T).DRE_SRV2 + (endVoting,T ).DRE_SRV0
System equation:
((DRE_Client0[i ] <L 1> DRE_SRV0[j ])<L 2> Voter0[i ])
where i is the number of voters in the system , j is the number of e-voting
servers ,
L1 =
 voteCryptogramsReq, voteCryptogramsReply, signTranscrip-tReq,signTranscriptReply,castedVoteMSG, castedVoteAck, verified-VoteMSG,verifiedVoteAck, reselect, endVoting
,
L2 =
 selectVoteReq, castOrVerifyReq, selectVoteReply, castReply, verifyRe-ply,voteCastingComplete, voteVerificationComplete, reselectOrEndVoting,reselect, endVoting, reselectVoteReq

3.3 Response Time Analysis
In the constructed PEPA model, we are interested in the performance overhead
introduced by individual verifiability property, particularly the voter actions
that he takes to verify that his vote was recorded correctly. The voters are
interested in timely responses when they cast their votes and at the same time
interested in verifying that their recorded votes reflect their intentions. There-
fore, we will investigate the effect of the individual verification actions by voters
on the average response time that voters expect when they cast their votes.
We constructed a PEPA model for the DRE-i e-voting scheme which was
composed of three components: voter, voting client, and voting server. To
study the average response time for casting a vote by a voter we will use littleś
law:
L = λW (1)
where L is the population ( the average number of jobs in the system), λ is
the throughput, and W is the average time spent by the job inside the system.
Due to the state-space explosion of the PEPA model when modelling large
number of components, the Eclipse PEPA plugin ran into the "Java heap space"
error. However, using PEPA CTMC performance analysis approach we could
calculate average response time for our PEPA model with small numbers of
voters and DRE-i voting servers.
4 Conclusion
This paper showed the performance modelling and evaluation of the DRE-i e-
voting scheme using PEPA. The model captured the e-voting scheme high-level
interactions between voters, voting clients and voting servers with emphasis
on the behaviour of the individual verifiability of the scheme. The analysis of
response time of casting votes suffered from the state space explosion problem
when we used the CTMC analysis and further performance analysis using more
scalable performance evaluation techniques like fluid analysis and stochastic
simulation will be investigated.
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